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We propose a method for DDoS detection by constructing a fuzzy estimator on the mean
packet inter arrival times. We divided the problem into two challenges, the first being the
actual detection of the DDoS event taking place and the second being the identification of
the offending IP addresses. We have imposed strict real time constraints for the first
challenge and more relaxed constraints for the identification of addresses. Through
empirical evaluation we confirmed that the detection can be completed within improved
real time limits and that by using fuzzy estimators instead of crisp statistical descriptors
we can avoid the shortcomings posed by assumptions on the model distribution of the
traffic. In addition we managed to obtain results under a 3 sec detection window.
ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction attacker and victim resources, the DDoS manifestationA Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a relatively
simple, yet very powerful technique to attack Internet
resources (Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004). Perhaps the
most representative DDoS attack in terms of social, polit-
ical and national impact was the 2007 attack on Estonia
which literally “unplugged” the Internet from the country
(Goth, 2007; Jenik, 2009). DDoS attacks are recognized to be
part of cyber warfare tactics but are often employed for
blackmail and extortion, primarily for financial gain
purposes.
In principle a posteriori DDoS detection is trivial, in the
sense that it is noticed once it is successful. However
a DDoS maintains a manifestation phase where the attack
develops and reaches a threshold which compromises the
availability of a legitimate service. Depending on both the.N. Shiaeles), vkatos@ee.
ier Ltd. All rights reservephase may range from a few seconds to minutes. As such,
in order to thwart a DDoS attack, not only the detection of
the event must be completed during the manifestation
phase, but the offending hosts need to be identified in order
for an incident response control to be effective. In terms of
incident response effectiveness, the underlying control
must be able to block network traffic belonging to the DDoS
attack vector.
In this paper we explore the use of fuzzy estimators on
network traffic in order to establish whether a DDoS takes
place and to identify the suspect, participating hosts. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
a review of the current state of the art DDoS detection tech-
niques. In Section 3 we develop the theoretical underpinning
of the proposed method. Sections 4 and 5 contain the empir-
ical results and conclusions respectively.duth.gr (V. Katos), karakos@ee.duth.gr (A.S. Karakos), papadob@
d.
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Detection of security breach attempts such as network
intrusion and DoS attacks fall into two main categories,
namely pattern (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004) or misuse detec-
tion and anomaly detection (Katos, 2007; Patcha and Park,
2007). In the former we explicitly define patterns of behavior
that are classified as malicious and should these are observed
within the network traffic, we assume that the underlying
system is under attack. In anomaly detection we model
normal or benign behavior is and if any outliers emerge
outside the prescribed envelope we conclude that the system
is under attack. Our proposed method falls into the anomaly
detection category.
From a practical perspective, a DDoS attack is associated
with bursting traffic (Li et al., 2003). As such, DDoS detection
focuses on distinguishing DDoS traffic bursts with benign type
of bursts, such as flash crowds for example. In anomaly
detection terms, we need to define what normal behavior is.
On the network level, this is typically done by adopting
a packet arrival model. However, choosing a suitable model is
problematic. Although the most prevalent theoretic model in
networking is Poisson (Park et al., 2006) which has been used
for many years, the modern Internet has triggered a heated
discussion and dispute in the literature. In their landmark
paper, Paxson and Floyd (1995) explicitly argue that Internet
traffic cannot be expressed by Poisson arrival. Although this
position has many followers, their claim is directly disputed
by Gribble and Brewer (1997). As it seems that no consensus
can be reached in the selection of themodel, we are lead to the
conclusion that the model must depend upon a particular
number of parameters (such as type of protocol, whether it is
human generated or not, temporal scope) and context (see for
example Arlitt and Williamson, 1997).. In Wang’s et al. (2002)
words, “it may not be possible to model the total number of
TCP connections at all times by a simple parametric model”.
For example, flash crowds are assumed to be Poisson (Li et al.,
2008a,b; Ari et al., 2003), whereas HTTP traffic as a whole may
or may not be display Poissonity; the work by Guerin et al.
(2003) captures these contradictions.
However there seems to be a slight precedence of Pois-
sonity in the literature when it comes to modeling human
generated HTTP traffic. This is true when the temporal
window of analysis is relatively small, as in the opposite case
the arrivals may be non-stationary and will in effect depart
from a Poisson model. A small window is desirable in DDoS
attack detection, and therefore deviations from the Poisson
model may reveal that the packet arrival times may not be
human generated (i.e. botnet driven DDoS attacks).
This paper was motivated against the above and we argue
that Poisson can be considered for DDoS detection, but only in
conjunction with fuzzy estimators. A fuzzy estimator will in
essence capture all statistical information within a fuzzy
number (in our particular case we use alpha-cuts, a-cuts). By
doing this, any error introduced due to the adoption of inap-
propriate model tends to zero, as the fuzzy estimator allows
for this uncertainty. The limitation though of using such an
approach is the dependency upon historical data and there-
fore lack of such data do not allow the application of theapproach. However, lack of historical data is rather
uncommon in real life, production systems.
Another constraint set out in this paper is the real time
requirement. We argue that any DDoS method in order to be
effective and offer added value to the infrastructure it protects
should be able to perform in real time. We consider the upper
limit for detection delay to be equal to the capacity of the
server which is being protected. In a recent paper (Wang and
Yang, 2008) a “real time” detection of DDoS was achieved by
using fuzzy rules on the Hurst parameter. The time needed for
the attack to be detected successfully was 13 s which can be
classified as realtime in a certain context. The Hurst param-
eter was also considered (Xia et al., 2010) which in this case it
was calculated through statistical traffic analysis and more
particularly through the discrete wavelet transform (DWT)
and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). Wei et al. (2006)
augment fuzzy classification approaches with cross correla-
tion in order to improve the accuracy of DDoS detection.
Although combination of methods is expected to produce
improved accuracy results, the realtime requirement is not
met due to the increased computational costs.
The nature of the DoS attack has encouraged the employ-
ment of many statistical tools (Feinstein et al., 2003). Apart
from their appropriateness, statistical tools are also preferred
in DDoS detection because of their high responsive potential
(Oshima et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2006). In (Sengar et al., 2008;
Tang et al., 2009) the authors make use of the Hellinger
Distance which is a metric used to measure the distance
between two probability distributions. The detection method
is applied in the domain of VoIP communications. Covariance
analysis (Jin and Yeung, 2004; Yeung et al., 2007) is also used to
statistically distinguish normal traffic behavior from flooding.
Other categories of DDoS detection tools include the use of
entropy (Lakhina et al., 2005; Feinstein et al., 2003; Yu et al.,
2008), neural networks (Arun Raj Kumar and Selvakumar,
2011), fractals and wavelets (Li and Lee, 2003; Li, 2004;
Rinco´n and Sallent, 2005), as well as Support Vector Machines
(Ramamoorthi et al., 2011; Shon et al., 2005), Genetic Algo-
rithms (Lee et al., 2011; Li et al., 2008a,b) and FCMs (Siraj et al.,
2004).3. Description of the proposed method
We initially provide a qualitative description of the proposed
method. Consider a web site with varying, benign hits
throughout a period of time (say a day). Since the number of
hits varies, the corresponding time series will be non-
stationary; in our case this will be the TCP packet arrival
times related to the HTTP traffic. The period needs to be
broken into smaller time windows where the length of each
time window would be small enough so that it is comparable
to the real time detection DDoS limits and to fit to a Poisson
model. For each period we calculate the average packet arrival
time. If we were to guarantee that the underlying model is
Poisson, then during an attack we could statistically compare
the recorded, historical mean with the current, observed one.
In the case of an attack we would test whether the new mean
is statistically smaller than the historical one. However, since
an attack e being non-human e may not fit a Poisson
Fig. 1 e Non-asymptotic fuzzy mean estimator.
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Therefore we would need to relax the model assumption. In
this paper this is achieved by the introduction of fuzzy esti-
mators and more specifically with the so called a-cuts which
are formally described in the next section. The method
adopted in this research was originally developed and pub-
lished in recent work by Tsironis et al. (2010) and Chrysafis
and Papadopoulos (2009).
Upon detection of a DDoS attack, the next step would be to
identify the offending hosts. This is a challenging phase for
two reasons. First, the accuracy of the method needs to be
high in terms of false negatives and positives. Second, in order
to themethod to be practical and offer added value, it needs to
be able to detect the hosts in real time, that is within certain
tight limits. Since the mean would already be expressed by
a fuzzy estimator, we have all the information necessary to
perform a computationally inexpensive comparison. Detec-
tion is done by measuring the mean packet arrival for each IP
against the fuzzy estimator.
3.1. Non-asymptotic fuzzy estimators: our approach
In this section, we present a more natural way of constructing
fuzzy estimators. The network parameter we have selected to
monitor is the packet arrival interval and the fuzzy estimator
we attempt to construct is the mean packet arrival time. As
stated earlier, the fuzzy estimator is capable of capturing all
the statistical information generated from the historical data
in a single (fuzzy) number. In a DDoS event the observed
packet arrival time will be less than the mean packet arrival
time. We move on to describe how to derive this fuzzy esti-
mator of the mean.
Proposition 1. Let X1,X2,.,Xn be a random sample and
letx1,x2,.xn be sample values assumed by the sample.
Let alsob˛½0; 1Þ. If the sample size is large enough and F
denotes the standard normal distribution function, then
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and the a-cuts of this fuzzy number are the closed intervals:
aM ¼

x zgðaÞ sﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ; xþ zgðaÞ sﬃﬃﬃ
n
p

(2)
which are exactly the (1a)(1b) confidence intervals for m,
where
gðaÞ ¼

1
2
 b
2

aþ b
2
;

g : ½0; 1/

b
2
; 0:5

and
zgðaÞ ¼ F1ð1 gðaÞÞ
The graph of this fuzzy number is presented in Fig. 1.The fuzzy estimator consists of the triangle-shaped lines
which are constructed by the discrete observations obtained
from the empirical network data. Let us assume that the
above graph is a fuzzy estimator from historical, non-DDoS
data (say from the previous day). The mean value x speci-
fying the peak of the graph divides the triangle into a left and
a right side. From this point onward we need to estimate the
mean arrival times of packets of the current, present traffic,
tc. We then place this value on the fuzzy estimator and if it is
on the left-hand side (that is tc < x) then we record a DDoS
attack. For tc > x we can either consider a normal network
operation, or alternatively we can assign a possibility of DDoS
value, where this possibility increases the closer tc is to x and
depending on the security policy we can set a further
threshold or actions, such as increase the logging or alert
levels.
We now show how to calculate tc. As a starting hypothesis,
we consider that the traffic fits the Poisson density function
fðxÞ ¼ PðXt ¼ xÞ ¼ ðqtÞ
x
x!
eqt
which has distribution function F(t) ¼ 1  eqt
In this case q equals to the number of packet arrivals/
second.
PðT < tÞ ¼ 1 eqt
We have to find tc, such that
FðtcÞ ¼ 1 eqtc  p;
where p is a given probability.
Solving this inequality, we take: tc  lnð1 pÞ=q
We take in to account thatE(T ) ¼ qt and firstly we do the
estimation EðTÞ ¼ t ¼ qt.
Then, we take the confidence intervals for mean and we
form the fuzzy estimator for tc using equation (2).
Let [la,ra] be the a -cut for the fuzzy number E(T ).
Then, [E(T )]a ¼ [la,ra] and hence, we find the a  cut for the
fuzzy number tc as follows:
½tca ¼

ln

1
1 p
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1
ra
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
1
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Upon detecting a DDoS attack, we move on to the second
challenge, which is about identifying the offending IP
Fig. 2 e Job seeking site statistics.
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is in the region of 1 s in order to satisfy the real time
requirement) we calculate the density of the each unique IP
address (that is the number of packets generated by unique IP)
and from that we can recalculate the mean inter-arrival time
tc as described above, but for this time on a per-IP basis. In
a similar manner, if tc is below the mean of the fuzzy esti-
mator, we classify the corresponding IP address as part of the
DDoS. Naturally, this approach is expected to perform better
in the case of botnets sending requests on a high rate.Fig. 3 e The4. Empirical evaluation
4.1. Data sets
We used the publicly available LLS_DDOS_1.0 DARPA Intrusion
Detection Evaluation datasets (MIT DARPA, 2000) and also
generated our own datasets. The primary data were generated
byattackingapopular job seeking site residing on theuniversity
campus (Fig. 2). The site has around 8000 visits per day and istestbed.
Fig. 4 e 4 sec of normal traffic tc a-cuts. Fig. 6 e 4 sec DDoS traffic tc a-cuts.
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seeking site on a national scale. The fact that the site is hosted
on a university campus networkwas particularly suitable aswe
could emulate DDoS activity without causing any network
bottlenecks and we were able to assess the effectiveness of the
proposedmethod andmore particularly its real time aspects.
The data was collected by mirroring the server’s ethernet
port and by capturing the inbound traffic on ports 80 and 443.
This was considered to be the most appropriate approach as
all other traffic was blocked at the firewall level.
We executed two attacks in different days and conditions,
generating two datasets. The first day we attacked the server
during a low visit period, whereas the second day we attacked
the server during a high peak visit period. For our experiment
we used hping and BlackEnergy Bot which is an HTTP-based
botnet used primarily for DDoS attacks. Unlike most
common bots, this bot does not communicate with the botnet
master using IRC but the widely used web services. It also has
the ability to encrypt the communication data with the server.
The bot was setup in a fully controlled environment. The total
number of bots we utilized was 6, communicating with the
C&C Server (Fig. 3). Formore information on the attack refer to
Shaeles and Psaroudakis (2011).Fig. 5 e 12 sec normal traffic tc a-cuts.4.2. Empirical results
tc and a-cuts were calculated according to the approach
described in Section 3. We calculated tc for normal traffic
during the busiest hours of the server. Then this attribute
was converted to a fuzzy estimator and then the values were
used to identify the IPs involved in the DDoS in the imported
data as follows. Firstly we calculate the a-cut boundaries in
line with Fig. 1 presented above. The peak of the curves
denotes the expected mean value of tc. This value essentially
splits the graph into two areas. Values of tc residing on the
left side of tc. are considered to be DDoS attacks. Values of tc
residing on the right side of tc.ve a degree of possibility for
a DDoS attack.
More analytically the a-cuts were empirically obtained as
follows. We split normal traffic data into files with 500, 1000,
5000, 10,000, 20,000, 30,000, 40,000, 50,000, 100,000, 150,000,
200,000 network packets e with each packet denoting
a network event e and we produced tc graphs for each of the
files; the split allows us to consider the differences of the
traffic as we can get a finer granularity of the tc. In the Figures
below we present graphs that show in our sample of 4 s ofFig. 7 e 12 sec DDoS traffic tc a-cuts.
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(Fig. 4) and 12 s normal traffic on a lesser busy period, corre-
sponding to the same number of packets (Fig. 5). It should be
noted that the orders of tc.e comparable, as they are shown in
a different scale of the x-axis.
In contrast, the 4-s DDoS traffic containsmore than 100,000
packets in the csv file and the 12 s of DDoS traffic is in the area
of 610,000 packets in the file. The graphs or DDoS traffic are
shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
From visually inspecting the above graphswe can establish
that for up to a period of 2 s, the curve forms for DDoS and
normal traffic are not particularly distinguishable; however, in
the case of a DDoS we obtain considerably smaller values. If
we increase the sample size we obtain the results as shown in
Fig. 4 which is expected as all our traffic is closer to tc. .e
obtained similar results with the DARPA dataset. We split the
dataset (LLS_DDOS_1.0-inside.dump) into chunks of 5000,
10,000, 20,000e100,000, 150,000 and 200,000 packets which
corresponded to approximately 2 min to 1.5 h periods. The
import time for each chunk ranged from less than half
a second to 23 s. We established that 5000 packets for this
dataset were sufficient to perform successful detection. The
detection time was performed in 2 s.
4.3. Performance, accuracy and limitations
The execution of the implemented algorithm for our data-
sets took around 1 min to import 610,000 packets and 40 s
to analyze them and return potential IPs that participate in
the DDoS attack (Shaeles and Psaroudakis, 2011) (Fig. 8).
The system used was Intel Core Quad Q9950 with 8 GB ofFig. 8 e Results from 4 sRAM. Both in terms of performance and accuracy, the
proposed approach provided significant results as it could
identify successfully 3/5, 5/5 or 5/6 IPs (depending on the
dataset chunk) involved in the DDoS in 1.5e5.9 s respec-
tively. The corresponding packet count ranges from 5000 to
20,000.
Following our tests we can see that successful DDoS
detection is possible after collecting about 5000 network
events but best results occur after 20,000 packets. With 20,000
packets the computation was completed in 1.8 s. With respect
to training, the detection requires a minimum of 5000 packets
or 2 s worth of traffic. During a DDoS flood, 2 s of traffic may
correspond to up to 100,000 packets. This means that 20,000
packets will be captured in 400 ms. As such, the total time for
detection is expected to be in the region of 2.4 s.
With respect to the DARPA dataset the proposed method
detected successfully the 2 attacking IPs and 4 spoofed IPs as
false positives. According to the dataset description there
were three attacking IPs, but the third one did not have any
traffic to the victim server in the scenario we investigated and
therefore it was non-surprisingly not detected. Another point
was that with the DARPA dataset the attacks were on various
ports apart from port 80. Since the proposed method depends
only on the arrival time, the attack was detected. As other
ports (such as telnet and ftp) definitely do not follow a Poisson
model, our results confirm the independence from the Pois-
sonity requirement. It should also be noted that the historical
data of the DARPA dataset were limited. We used 4 s worth of
packets for the training which was sufficient to yield fairly
accurate results. According to the DARPA dataset specifica-
tions, there were three offending IPs in total. Our method(100,000 packets).
Table 1 e Dataset summary and findings.
Dataset Time window
(range)
Number
of packets
(range)
Analysis
time (range)
Number of IPs found Analysis time vs.
no. of packets
correlation coefficient
r2
Low traffic
period (botnet)
1e4 sec 5Ke100K 1e6 ms 5/6 with 40 K packets,
2sec training
5/6 with 20K packets,
5K packets training
0.994625245 0.9892
High traffic
period (hping)
38e95 sec 5Ke100K 79e131 ms 2/2 for 10,000 packets
and over.
0.995133989 0.9902
MIT-DARPA
LLS_DDOS_1.0
228e1933 sec 5Ke70K 122e10K ms 2/3 with 5000 packets 0.983643161 0.9675
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dataset we observed that the third IP communicated only with
the attack host rather than the victim server. As such, the
effective success rate was 100%.
Table 1 presents a summary of the datasets and some
quantitative attributes. There is a strong linear relation
between the number of packets and analysis time. The total
response time is proportional to the total number of unique
IPs. In Figs. 9 and 10 we show the representative relationships
for our two datasets respectively.
Comparing this method with other published research,
we need to highlight that all papers that we consulted on
real time DDoS detection display their time performance
abilities, but most of them do not explicitly state the data
import delays. Naturally, data import delays are expected to
be independent of the actual detection algorithm perfor-
mance, but we argue that when proposing a practical real
time solution, the total time (or computational complexity)Fig. 9 e Processing overheads for botnet dataset (time vs.
number of packets).needs to be included, as the data import and preparation
needs may be different for each detection algorithm. For
instance, our implementation requires that the data are
sorted by IP numbers. Although we use an efficient sorting
algorithm, the overheads due to the sorting complexity are
present and cannot be avoided. As such, the total response
times presented above include also data import delays. For
example, Gavrilis and Dermatas (2005) who develop an
efficient and effective neural network classifier, claim DDoS
detection within a 6 s window, but there is no information
on the total time. If we assume that this 6 s window is the
best case scenario, then our proposed approach is about 2.5
times fold more efficient. Such significant difference is
anticipated as our approach uses only one feature (arrival
time).
In general the proposed method is prone to false positives
for spoofed IPs or NAT arrangements. This is expected
because of the limited granularity of attributes the proposed
method has. We prefer real time detection methods to be
susceptible to false positives which can later be corrected by
other means (such as packet inspection), rather than the
opposite. As there is no silver bullet for DDoS detection, in
production environments we need integrated threat
management systems including a component which focuses
on the real timeliness of DDoS detection. IP spoofing would
therefore need to be addressed by augmenting or integrating
the proposed methods with other ones (see for example MIT’s
spoofer project, Beverly and Bauer, 2005) as well as network
and firewall configurations (for example, block the 10.0.x.xFig. 10 e Total DDoS response time for syn flood attack
using hping dataset (time vs. number of packets).
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inspection).5. Conclusions and future work
We proposed an approach for detecting a DDoS attack using
a fuzzy estimator on the mean time between network events.
DDoS detection is particularly challenging in sites with a large
average number of hits, as the detection methods typically
generate false positives and are not practical. Yet, when
a DDoS attack is detected, it is imperative to identify the
offending hosts in a timely manner in order to offer added
value intrusion response services. The proposed method is
capable of detecting a DDoS and identifying the malicious IPs
before the victim service suffers from exhaustion of resources
due to the attack. The empirical evaluation showed that the
proposed method can have an over 80% success rate (which
corresponds to 20% Type-II errors).
The method can run on a mid-range PC and can provide
near-real time DDoS detection. However, its full potential
would be appreciated if run on a higher end PC or by
employing the parallel architecture of graphics cards.
Currently we are implementing a version of the algorithm
whichwill be compatible to NVidia’s CUDA framework andwe
are also considering a non-preemptive OS kernel. The non-
preemptive kernel is required in order to improve the import
and analysis times.
Although the proposedmethod uses the arrival time as the
main metric for discriminating benign from DDoS traffic, it is
expected that additional features will substantially improve
the accuracy and possibly speed of the proposedmethod, as it
will require a smaller amount of data. In general as this
method is very accurate in detecting the DDoS attack and
fairly accurate for identifying the offending IP addresses
within strict time limits that allow the system to respond in
real time, the identification challenge can be further refined by
the application of other methods. The proposed method
depends upon the time parameter (and more specifically on
packet inter-arrival times) so a finer granularity by intro-
ducing other aspects (such as packet parameters, protocols
and so forth) is expected to improve the identification accu-
racy. A short term, ongoing research activity is the evaluation
of the identification ability of the method in large botnets and
establish the thresholds where false negatives become
significant.
In the case of flash crowds we expect that the method will
detect a DDoS but will not be able to classify any IP as an
offending one. Flash crowds typically involve many IPs and do
not make many requests per second per IP. Therefore the
method can explicitly detect flash crowd activity if it will
detect a DDoS but no IPs. Such analysis deserves a future
research line.
In this paper we attempt to relax the strict requirements of
amodel as this is problematic, instead of trying to find a better
model which we conjecture that it would be a futile exercise.
Nevertheless, we need to assume some model as a point of
reference, and themost obvious and popular onewas Poisson.
Possibly our proposed method will also work with other
models, which is an area of future research.Acknowledgments
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